A treatise of human nature. A Treatise of Human Nature (1896 ed.) 2019-01-09

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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume

a treatise of human nature

Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other. Abstract: More up-to-date both on general and on political philosophy than anything else I know. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. A cause traces the way to our thought, and in a manner forces us to survey such certain objects, in such certain relations. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine.

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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume on Apple Books

a treatise of human nature

Worth a second read because of the relation of the concepts discussed in this book with many Impressions and ideas. Reason is an ultimate good for Hume and it comes from experiences. The idea strikes not on us with such vivacity; and consequently has no such influence on the passion and imagination. Indeed, we can grasp that such an ability counting and spacial-motoral skills seem to be bred into us, as innate mental structures. These relations are resemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety; none of which are implied in this proposition, Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence. . We must therefore, turn ourselves to some other quarter to seek the origin of that idea.

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: with Hume's Abstract of A Treatise... 9780872202290

a treatise of human nature

Passions include states of being grief, joy , reaction fear , and action avarice, curiosity , and generic resisting actions aversion and generic seeking actions propensity. On the other hand, anything proposed to us, which causes surprize and admiration, gives such a satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions, and will never be persuaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation. Of the relations of impressions and ideas. For, I beseech you, by what rule or standard do you judge, when you assert, that the line, in which I have supposed them to concur, cannot make the same right line with those two, that form so small an angle betwixt them? The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body? Fourthly, As the individuals are collected together, said placed under a general term with a view to that resemblance, which they bear to each other, this relation must facilitate their entrance in the imagination, and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion. Affections provide the motive force and understanding reason tells us how to work with them. It is because of such thinkers that, centuries later, we have a rich and mutable scientific and philosophical discourse about how we should conduct ourselves based on our experience as embodied beings. For most the interest stems from the importance of the philosopher as part of the study of the history of philosophy.

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David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature

a treatise of human nature

Let any of them give an answer, to whatever sect he belongs, and whether he maintains the composition of extension by indivisible points, or by quantities divisible in infinitum. Perhaps the religious climate at the time precluded him from being as radical a moral skeptic as he was a skeptic when it came to the understanding. The principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex idea, gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are the others, which first presented themselves. But when we compare experiments, and reason a little upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the independent existence of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience. Of Modes and Substances I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desired good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the proposed effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible.

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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume

a treatise of human nature

When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. Of the transference of property by consent. Hume says all ideas come from our senses; all knowledge gets mediated through our senses and must come before concepts; cause is only a label arising from continuity, regularity, custom and habit for which we mentally construct a relationship; and our sympathy arising from sensibilities create what we label morality. Not only we are incapable of telling, if the case be in any degree doubtful, when such particular figures are equal; when such a line is a right one, and such a surface a plain one; but we can form no idea of that proportion, or of these figures, which is firm and invariable. He has argued elsewhere quite convincingly that its impossible to know a cause from its effects. Of the other virtues and vices. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas.

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A Treatise of Human Nature : David Hume : 9780140432442

a treatise of human nature

But though this answer be very common, I defy these metaphysicians to conceive the matter according to their hypothesis, or imagine the floor and roof, with all the opposite sides of the chamber, to touch each other, while they continue in rest, and preserve the same position. Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? When we are present, we say we feel, or see it. A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility but his meaning is, that we should consider the figure and colour together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738, every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another.

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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume on Apple Books

a treatise of human nature

When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an inference from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on, till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember. Of the influence of the imagination on passions Sect. If it be asked whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt them, touch or not: it may be answered, that this depends upon the definition of the word, touch. The length of the Index demands apology or at least justification. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason. The third objection carries the matter still farther, and not only asserts, that the idea of a vacuum is real and possible, but also necessary and unavoidable. But however we may express ourselves, we must always confess, that we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with sensible objects, and conceiving its parts as visible or tangible.

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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume on Apple Books

a treatise of human nature

Of curiosity, or the love of truth. Of the pride and humility of animals. Concerning this there can be no difficulty. The most proper method, in my opinion, of giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the mind, is by producing other instances, which are analogous to it, and other principles, which facilitate its operation. As the first species of distance is found to be convertible into the second, it is in this respect a kind of cause; and the similarity of their manner of affecting the senses, and diminishing every quality, forms the relation of resemblance. Indeed, we can grasp that such an ability counting and spacial-motoral skills seem to be bred into us, as innate mental structures. After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me.

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A Treatise of Human Nature Summary & Study Guide

a treatise of human nature

The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal. On ne saurait pas aborder ces difficiles questions de morale sans bien s'entendre préalablement sur le sens des mots, sans quoi on courrait le risque de se laisser abuser par eux, et de se payer de belles formules qui nous plaisent, car notre imagination complète le sens qu'il n'y trouve pas par celui qui nous agrée. I shall here take occasion to propose a second observation concerning our demonstrative reasonings, which is suggested by the same subject of the mathematics. Hume has always been one of my favorite philosophers. It is not for want of rays of light striking on our eyes, that the minute parts of distant bodies convey not any sensible impression; but because they are removed beyond that distance, at which their impressions were reduced to a minimum, and were incapable of any farther diminution. My experience improved as I pressed on, however. The very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to its correlative.

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A treatise of human nature (Book, 1978) [gluedtomatoes.com]

a treatise of human nature

I shall add as a fourth corrollary, that we can never have reason to believe that any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea. But belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility. Should any one think to elude this argument; and without determining whether our reasoning on this subject be derived from demonstration or probability, pretend that all conclusions from causes and effects are built on solid reasoning: I can only desire, that this reasoning may be produced, in order to be exposed to our examination. We shall now correct this fault by giving a precise definition of cause and effect. We may illustrate this by considering the sense of feeling, and the imaginary distance or interval interposed betwixt tangible or solid objects.

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